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Divine Simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no metaphysical complexity; 
he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic properties. Recently, Jeffrey Brower has put 
forward an account of divine simplicity that has it that God is the truthmaker for all intrinsic 
essential predications about him. This allows Brower to preserve the intuitive thought that God is 
not a property but a concrete being. In this paper, I provide two objections to Brower’s account 
that are meant to show that whatever merits this account of divine simplicity has, plausibility is 
not one of them. 
 
Divine simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no metaphysical complexity; 
he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic properties. Now modern discussions of divine 
simplicity have tended to focus exclusively on a version of divine simplicity that makes God 
identical to a property.
1
 But, as has been stressed before, saying that God is a property is highly 
implausible.
2
 Jeffrey Brower, a proponent of divine simplicity, agrees when he says 
 
the strategy they adopt [the strategy of making God identical to a property] for 
making sense of simplicity appears not only extreme, but also extremely ad hoc. 
Indeed, it would seem that any account of simplicity that could render the doctrine 
coherent without giving up the traditional conception of properties would be 
preferable to them.
3
 
 
I concur. There is just not much going for this view.
4
 So let's take a look at another, fairly recent, 
account of divine simplicity. And here we turn to Brower.
5
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 According to Brower, there is no need to identify God with a property in order to make 
sense of divine simplicity. Identifying him as the truthmaker for intrinsic essential predications 
about him will do.
6
 In order to see what leads him to say this, we need to get clear on what 
Brower takes the doctrine of divine simplicity to be. He says 
 
the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity can be expressed in terms of the 
requirements it places on divine predications. At least as understood by the 
medievals, what this doctrine tells us is that if a predication such as “God is good” 
is true, then there exists an entity, God’s goodness, that is identical with God; 
likewise, if “God is powerful” is true, then God’s power exists and is identical 
with God; and so on for other such true divine predications.
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Summing this up, Brower says that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity is expressed by, 
and requires nothing more than, the following: 
 
Simplicity. If an intrinsic predication of the form 'God is F' is true, then God's F-
ness exists and is identical with God. 
 
Brower then argues that Simplicity is ontologically neutral with respect to what God's F-ness is. 
He says 
 
So understood, the doctrine of divine simplicity takes no stand whatsoever on the 
precise nature of the entities with which it identifies God. It does assume that 
there are (or at least could be) entities corresponding to expressions such as 
‘God’s goodness’, ‘God’s power’, and ‘God’s wisdom’. Nonetheless, it says 
nothing about the specific ontological category to which they belong.
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From this, Brower concludes that in order to avoid identifying God with a property, all we have 
to do is accept the intuitively plausible truthmaker account of predication: 
 
Truthmaker. If an intrinsic predication of the form 'a is F' is true, then a's F-ness 
exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for <a is F>.
9
 
 
That Truthmaker avoids identifying God with a property should be obvious. For instead of 
identifying a's F-ness with a property, Truthmaker identifies it with that which makes true <a is 
F> and there is no reason to think that the truthmaker, at least in this case, is a property. As 
Brower says, “to characterize an entity as a truthmaker is to characterize it in terms of a certain 
metaphysical function or role,” viz., that of making some proposition true.10 This, according to 
Brower, “leaves open the possibility that truthmakers can belong to ontological categories of 
very different kinds, including both concrete individuals (such as persons) and properties.”11 
Furthermore, with respect to intrinsic essential predications such as <Plato is a human> 
and contingent predications such as <Plato is wise>, Brower thinks that all that is required as a 
truthmaker for the former, but not the latter, is Plato.
12
 That it is plausible that only Plato is 
required to make true <Plato is a human> is due to its being the case that part of what it is to be 
Plato is to be human; being human is essential to Plato. However, this line of reasoning does not 
hold for <Plato is wise> since being wise is not part of what it is to be Plato. Now since the 
reason for thinking that Plato is a truthmaker for his essential predications generalizes, we can 
say that concrete individuals are, in general, truthmakers for their true intrinsic essential 
predications. 
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So Simplicity, when coupled with Truthmaker, and given what was just said concerning 
intrinsic essential predications, entails that God is identical with the truthmakers for his intrinsic 
essential predications. This result is not absurd. As Brower says 
 
the truthmaker interpretation goes considerable distance toward rendering the 
doctrine of divine simplicity coherent. On this interpretation, for example, the 
doctrine does not require that God is identical with each of his properties, and 
hence is himself a property. In fact, it does not even require that God has any 
properties at all (in the ontologically loaded sense of exemplifiables). On the 
contrary, all the doctrine requires is that, for every true intrinsic divine 
predication, there is a truthmaker and God is identical with that truthmaker. But 
there is nothing obviously absurd about that.
13
 
 
So appealing to Truthmaker both avoids the absurd result that God is identical with a property 
and allows God to be a concrete individual. This is good.  
But is it good enough? No. For even though I am willing to agree with Brower that his 
brand of simplicity, which I will henceforth call Divine Truthmaker Simplicity ('DTS' for short), 
is more believable than the brand that identifies God with a property, I think there are good 
reasons to think it implausible. So in each of §1 and §2, I will provide an argument for thinking 
that DTS is implausible.
14
 In §3, I will show why these arguments are useless against a view 
according to which God is complex. 
 
1  The Truthmaker Argument 
5 
 
That God is the truthmaker for his intrinsic essential predications would seem to rely on the 
following principle: 
 
Essential. For any concrete x, if <p> is an intrinsic essential predication of x, then 
x makes <p> true. 
 
But why accept Essential? It does not strike me as obvious, and Brower's only defense of it 
requires appealing to its seeming plausibility. Brower says 
 
it does seem plausible to think that a concrete individual can be the truthmaker for 
a proper subset of its true essential predications — namely, each of its true 
intrinsic essential predications.
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Turning to God, Brower says 
 
This interpretation of simplicity seems promising if we focus on predications such 
as “God is divine”, “God is good”, and “God is powerful”. For in each of these 
cases, God can plausibly be regarded as their truthmaker.
16
 
 
So for Brower, Essential appears plausible and this, it would seem, is why he accepts it. But I do 
not have this plausibility intuition. And even if I did, I would reject it. Here is why. Truthmakers 
are supposed to be that which gives a metaphysical ground of truth, and grounds are supposed to 
be explanatory in nature.
17
 That is, if x makes <p> true, then x (or x's existence) metaphysically 
explains why <p> is true.
18
 As Brower himself says 
 
when a predication of the form ‘a is F’ is true, there must be something that makes 
it true—or better, some thing (or plurality of things) which explains its truth or in 
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virtue of which it is true. As these qualifications indicate, the notion of “making” 
at work here is not causal, but explanatory.
19
 
 
So if x fails to metaphysically explain (or as I will sometimes just say, explain) that <p> is true, 
then x fails to make <p> true. This tells against Essential. To use Brower’s example, take an 
intrinsic essential predication of Plato, <Plato is a human> and ask 'what makes this proposition 
true?' Notice that the answer cannot be Plato. Why? Because saying that this proposition is true 
in virtue of Plato or that Plato makes it true, and therefore explains why it is true that he is 
human, is explanatorily empty. Listing Plato as that which makes true <Plato is a human> is of 
no help in telling me what it is that metaphysically explains that it is true that he is a human. 
Now notice that I am not simply claiming that I cannot see how Plato explains the truth of <Plato 
is a human> (which, if true, could be a mere epistemic shortcoming on my part). Rather, I am 
claiming that I can see that he doesn't explain it. Plato, the concrete being, is just not rich enough 
to provide, on his own, a metaphysical ground of the truth of <Plato is a human>.
20
 However, if 
the answer to the above question is that the proposition is true because Plato instantiates being a 
human or that the state of affairs of Plato's being a human explains that it is true that Plato is a 
human, then I have been told something that is explanatorily helpful.
21
 I have been told not 
merely that Plato exists, but something about how Plato intrinsically is. And how Plato 
intrinsically is, as opposed to whether Plato is, metaphysically explains (and so grounds) that a 
proposition about how Plato intrinsically is has the property of being true. 
All this should be rather unsurprising. Intrinsic predications involve descriptions of the 
world. They involve saying that the world (or one of its inhabitants) is some way. But then it 
should come as no surprise that whatever makes such predications true must involve how the 
world in fact is (or how one of its inhabitants in fact is). There needs to be a kind match between 
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what is true and its truthmaker. If it is true that something is some way, then what makes it true 
must be structured in the right kind of way if it is to explain why the predication applies to it. 
Plato is just not structured in the way he needs to be if he is to explain why ‘is a human’ applies 
to him.
22
 But then Plato cannot explain why <Plato is a human> is true. 
I have been given the following response: For the advocate of DTS, pointing to Plato as 
that which makes true <Plato is a human> is a way of pointing to the essence of Plato, and that 
essence of Plato comes pre-built with what you are calling "how things (intrinsically and 
essentially) are". The essence of Plato is pre-built as being a human. Pointing to Plato, then, is a 
way of pointing to the truthmaker. 
But it is not at all clear how this helps matters, and for three reasons. First, even if 
pointing to Plato is a way of pointing to the truthmaker, it does not follow that Plato is the 
truthmaker (consider, pointing to a picture of Plato can be a way of pointing to him, but it does 
not follow from this that the picture is Plato). Second, how should we understand ‘pre-built’? On 
its most natural reading, the thought here is that if essences come pre-built with how things 
intrinsically and essentially are, then the essence is given to us as being composed by how the 
thing it is an essence of intrinsically and essentially is. But with respect to God, this cannot be 
the case if divine simplicity is true. God is his essence, and since God exhibits no metaphysical 
complexity, then neither does his essence. But his essence would if it were composed by how 
God intrinsically and essentially is. So until a meaning is given to ‘pre-built’ that does not entail 
that God is complex, the present response is, at best, inconclusive.  Third, even if how things 
intrinsically and essentially are is pre-built into the essences of those very things, it does not 
follow that the things that have the essences are good explanations for truths about their 
essences. That is, even if one could point to the essence of a thing simply by pointing to the thing 
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that has the essence, it does not follow that the thing is a good explanation for the truth of an 
intrinsic essential predication about the thing. Explanation is hyper-intensional. If x explains y, 
and x is intimately associated with z such that x necessitates z (as the instantiated essence of a 
thing necessitates the thing and vice-versa), it does not follow that z also explains y. It would 
follow if this intimate association were identity (which is precisely what divine simplicity 
theorists will say since according to divine simplicity, God is his essence). But this is, in large 
part, what my argument is questioning. Plato does not explain certain truths about how he 
intrinsically and essentially is. That Plato is some intrinsic, essential, way does. So Plato is not 
identical to how he intrinsically and essentially is. Therefore, on pain of begging the question, 
the present response has little to no force against the present objection. 
Here is a related response.
23
 Suppose we take the old-fashioned definition of a human as 
a rational animal. If, then, you beheld Plato himself – not just his bare existence, of course – you 
would, or could "see" that he's rational, and an animal, and that such are essential to him. So 
Plato does provide enough – if only one can understand him well enough – to explain the truth 
that Plato is a human. This is so even if it would be explanatorily empty for us to merely point at 
Plato in order to explain the truth that Plato is a human. Nonetheless, it would seem that the 
grounds of explanation are there, in Plato.  
But notice that, according to this response, to behold Plato himself requires to behold not 
just Plato, but how Plato essentially is. It is to behold that Plato is rational, and an animal, and 
that these are essential to him. So of course Plato, when beheld in this way, provides enough to 
explain the truth that Plato is a human since to behold Plato in this way is just to consider how 
Plato essentially is. So what is doing the explanatory work here is not really Plato, but how Plato 
essentially is. This is precisely what I am arguing for.  In agreement with this response, Plato 
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does provide enough (by being essentially human) even if Plato is not enough. In agreement with 
this response, the ground of the truth that Plato is a human is there, in Plato (because Plato is 
essentially human), even if this ground is not Plato himself. So really, this response is in 
complete agreement with me in suggesting that what Plato provides, or what is in Plato (namely, 
his being essentially some way), as opposed to Plato himself, does explain that it is true that he is 
a human. 
So, I claim, it is not Plato, but rather how Plato is, that explains why a proposition about 
how Plato is has the property of being true. A proposition about how Plato is has the property of 
being true in virtue of how Plato is and not in virtue of Plato. So Essential, which is required for 
DTS, is false. DTS is therefore in trouble. Now Essential (perhaps) has some recent historical 
support in the work of David Armstrong, a champion of truthmaking.
24
 Therefore, one cannot be 
accused of engaging in completely aberrant theorizing about truthmaking if they accept 
Essential. But of course, the point still holds. Insofar as truthmakers are supposed to 
metaphysically explain why truths are true (as Brower himself accepts), then merely appealing to 
a thing in order to explain why intrinsic essential claims about that thing are true is to provide a 
truthmaker that is too course-grained. We (including Armstrong) need to dig deeper, and provide 
more structure in our ontology, if we want satisfactory truthmakers here. 
Notice that this argument against Essential does not call 
 
Truthmaker. If an intrinsic predication of the form 'a is F' is true, then a's F-ness 
exists, where this entity is to be understood as the truthmaker for <a is F> 
 
into question. It is consistent with everything said above that a's F-ness makes true <a is F> so 
long as (at least in many cases) a's F-ness is not identical to a.
25
 For example, it is consistent with 
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everything said above that Plato's human-ness makes true <Plato is a human> so long as Plato’s 
human-ness is not identical to Plato. This shows us that there exists a tension between 
Truthmaker and 
 
Simplicity. If an intrinsic predication of the form 'God is F' is true, then God's F-
ness exists and is identical with God. 
 
According to Truthmaker, God's omnibenevolence makes <God is omnibenevolent> true. But 
according to Simplicity, God's omnibenevolence = God. However, God does not make <God is 
omnibenevolent> true for the very same reason that Plato does not make <Plato is a human> 
true. Merely pointing to God as an answer to 'what makes <God is omnibenevolent> true?' is 
explanatorily empty. As with Plato, what we need here is something about how God is and not 
merely whether God is. So God does not explain why <God is omnibenevolent> is true. But 
then, given Simplicity, neither does God's omnibenevolence, which contradicts Truthmaker.
26
 
Therefore, either Truthmaker or Simplicity has to go. But since both are required by DTS, then 
DTS must go as well. 
 
2  The Divine Predications Argument 
There exists a kind of priority ordering between God's intrinsic essential predications.
27
 God's 
intrinsic essential predications are not simply a list of predications every one of which is 
independent from every other. They are rather a unified and elegant lot. There is an order 
amongst them such that the truth of some “flow” from the truth of other more basic ones. Brower 
himself accepts this when he accepts that 
 
11 
 
(1) God is wise because God is divine28 
 
That God is divine is more basic or fundamental than that God is wise. That God is divine 
explains that God is wise.
29
 Alternatively, it might strike many that the reversal is true 
 
(2) God is divine, at least in part, because God is wise 
 
That God is wise is more basic or fundamental than that God is divine. That God is wise partly 
explains that God is divine. 
 Now what we have here between (1) and (2) are jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive, 
positions. Jointly exhaustive because it is just false that the truth of <God is wise> is not in any 
way explanatorily related to the truth of <God is divine>. Focusing on (1), notice how natural it 
is to think that God is wise (and good, and powerful, and just) because God is divine. As Brower 
says 
 
Traditional theists standardly derive the intrinsic divine attributes (or better, the 
truth of predications involving them) from their understanding of the divine 
nature. That is to say, they take God to be not only good, powerful, wise, and just, 
but to be all these things in virtue of being divine.
30
 
 
Mutually exclusive because (1) and (2) cannot both be true on pain of violating the irreflexivity 
of explanation. If God is wise because God is divine, and God is divine, at least in part, because 
God is wise, then it follows, by the transitivity of explanation (or partial explanation), that God is 
wise, at least in part, because God is wise. But this is false. That God is wise is not at all 
explained, even in part, by itself. So we must choose either (1) or (2) and we cannot choose both. 
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Let us, for sake of argument, accept (1) (the argument to follow would work just as well if we 
instead accepted (2)). 
 Here is a question everyone, and so the divine simplicity theorist, has to answer: what 
explains the pattern of dependency among the truth of the predications expressed in (1)? That is, 
why is it that the truth of one predication, that God is wise, depends on the truth of another, that 
God is divine, rather than the other way around? In short, why (1) rather than (2)? This question 
must have an answer. That one predication is true in virtue of another predication is not a 
fundamental fact. Predications, and their exemplifying a dependence order, are not brute, 
primitive, entities or facts. Perhaps there is nothing that explains why certain properties obtain in 
virtue of other properties, but predications are not properties. That a predication is true in virtue 
of another predication is a semantic fact and semantic facts are not (at least generally) part of the 
fundamental story of the world (indeed, it is precisely this intuition which undergirds the belief 
that a proposition's being true (which is a semantic fact) requires a truthmaker (something in the 
world that metaphysically explains its truth)). So the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) 
must have an explanation on pain of allowing (1), which is a semantic fact, to go ungrounded. 
 What then could explain this pattern? Perhaps the answer is that (1) is a conceptual truth, 
and so what explains why God is wise because God is divine, and not vice-versa, has to do with 
the concepts WISDOM and DIVINITY. Consider how the concepts BACHELOR, 
UNMARRIED, and MALE explain the pattern of dependency in 
 
(3) Bill is a bachelor because Bill is an unmarried male. 
 
BACHELOR is made up of, or composed or constituted by, UNMARRIED and MALE, and it is 
precisely because of this that Bill is a bachelor because he is an unmarried male and not the other 
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way around. It would be conceptually incoherent to think that Bill is an unmarried male because 
he is a bachelor. It is a conceptual truth that anyone who satisfies BACHELOR does so in virtue 
of satisfying UNMARRIED and MALE since BACHELOR decomposes into UNMARRIED and 
MALE. And it is a conceptual falsehood that anyone who satisfies UNMARRIED and MALE 
does so in virtue of satisfying BACHELOR since neither UNMARRIED nor MALE decomposes 
into bachelor. So the pattern of dependency exemplified in (3) is explained by appealing to the 
pattern of dependency exemplified by the concepts involved in (3). Unfortunately, this kind of 
explanation will not work in our present case. After all, (2) is a conceptually coherent claim. One 
could defend (2) against (1) without being confused about the concepts WISDOM and 
DIVINITY. It is a live debate whether we should accept (1) over (2), as it would not be if the 
disagreement over them boiled down to a disagreement over the concepts involved (as it 
plausibly does in the bachelor case). (1) is therefore not a conceptual truth. Brower agrees when, 
to paraphrase him, he says that it is a real question whether the list of divine predications (God is 
good, powerful, wise, just) depend on the predication of God's being divine, but that it is at least 
coherent to say that they do.
31
 But it wouldn't be a real question if (1) were a conceptual truth. If 
(1) were a conceptual truth, the question would be settled decisively in favor of (1). 
 Therefore, in accordance with what Brower indicates, the disagreement over whether (1) 
or (2) is true, which is just a disagreement over the pattern of dependency involved, is not a 
disagreement over the pattern of dependency exemplified between the concepts involved. Rather, 
it is a disagreement about how the world is. That is, it is not a conceptual disagreement, but a 
worldly disagreement. So what explains the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) has to do 
with the world and not our concepts of the world. 
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 In looking to the world, an initially plausible explanation of the pattern of dependency 
exemplified in (1) is the following 
 
(4) God's wisdom exists because God's divinity exists. 
 
Here, appeal is made to God's wisdom and divinity (as worldly entities as one can ask for). 
Moreover, what explains the pattern of dependency in (1) is simply that one of these worldly 
entities (God's wisdom) exists in virtue of the other (God's divinity). The thought here is that the 
pattern of dependency that holds for predications is explained by that which holds for certain 
worldly items. There is a certain fit of direction that exists between the dependency of 
predications on predications and worldly entities on worldly entities. That is, if x's F-ness exists 
because x's G-ness exists, then this explains that x is F because x is G. Now this fit of direction 
strikes me as quite plausible. However, and unfortunately for the proponent of DTS, appealing to 
it in order to explain the pattern of dependency involved in (1) will not do. In order to see why, 
consider that DTS is committed to 
 
Simplicity. If an intrinsic predication of the form 'God is F' is true, then God's F-
ness exists and is identical with God. 
 
Now it follows from the intrinsic essential predications involved in (1) and Simplicity that God's 
wisdom exists and is identical to God, and that God's divinity exists and is identical to God. But 
this, in conjunction with (4), entails that God exists because God exists, which is false. Nothing 
(not even God) can explain its own existence. Explanation is irreflexive and so what explains 
God's existence (if anything does) cannot be God's existence. Moreover, we should balk at the 
claim that God's existence is explained at all (even if what explains it is God's existence). For if 
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God is a se, then God does not exist because of anything, a fortiori, does not exist because of his 
existence.
32
 So, on pain of saying that God's existence depends on itself, we cannot maintain that 
God's wisdom exists because God's divinity exist — (4) must go. So even though it is true that 
God is wise because God is divine, it cannot follow that God's wisdom exists because God's 
divinity exists on pain of violating the irreflexivity of explanation and on pain of violating God's 
aseity (something the proponent of divine simplicity will be at pains to preserve). 
 Is there anything left to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1)? Here the 
DTS theorist will most likely appeal to God. God is what explains the pattern of dependency 
exemplified in (1). But this strains credulity. How is it that God alone can explain this pattern of 
dependency? After all, the existence of God is clearly consistent with the pattern of dependency 
expressed in (2). But then what reason is there to say that God explains the pattern exemplified in 
(1) but not (2)? For the DTS theorist, what is it about God that gives us (1) and not (2)? What is 
it about God that favors accepting (1) over (2)? There must be an answer to this. Unfortunately, 
given DTS's commitment to God's simplicity, I do not see how there could be. If simple, God is 
just not structured in the right kind of way (because he is not structured at all) to explain the 
pattern of dependency in (1). If simple, there can be nothing about God that favors accepting (1) 
over (2). So appealing to God alone is not the answer to our question. Instead, appeal must be 
made to how God is and not simply that he is. 
 It is important not to confuse this worry with another worry that Brower addresses. Here 
is this other worry: how can an absolutely simple thing make true a variety of distinct 
predications? Brower's response is to note that it is at least coherent that all, save one, of God's 
non-formal, intrinsic essential predications depend for their truth on the predication that God is 
divine. So, as was made clear above, according to Brower, God is good, powerful, wise, and just 
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because God is divine. Now since God is the truthmaker for <God is divine>, and since 
explanation is transitive and the truth of <God is divine> explains the truth of <God is good>, 
<God is powerful>, <God is wise>, and <God is just>, it follows that God is the truthmaker for 
all of these latter predications. So according to Brower, there is, in principle, no problem with 
God making true a variety of distinct predications. Notice though that none of this even begins to 
explain why the truth of <God is divine> explains the truth of <God is wise>. Rather, Brower 
simply assumes that it does and uses it to deflect a potential problem with DTS. But coming up 
with an explanation for why the truth of <God is divine> explains the truth of <God is wise> is 
precisely the worry that this section is concerned with. It is a worry that involves explaining, not 
how God can make true a variety of distinct predications about him, but how God can explain a 
pattern of dependency exemplified between distinct predications about him. 
 In light of all this, I am inclined to think that DTS has to take it as brute that the pattern of 
dependency exemplified in (1) holds.
33
 This is a mark against it. As I stressed above, that one 
predication is true in virtue of another predication, and not the other way around, is not a 
fundamental, unexplained, fact. It is a semantic fact, and semantic facts ultimately require a 
ground or explanation that appeals to the non-semantic world.  However, since I cannot see what 
someone who accepts DTS could accept as a plausible explanation for the pattern of dependency 
exemplified in (1), then I issue the following challenge: come up with an entity (or entities) that, 
if it exists (or if they exist), plausibly explains the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). 
 
3  Divine Truthmaker Complexity 
Let us contrast DTS with another view of God which I will call Divine Truthmaker Complexity 
('DTC' for short), where DTC is the conjunction of Truthmaker and 
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Complexity. If an intrinsic predication of the form 'God is F' is true, then God's F-
ness exists and is not identical with God. 
 
The above two arguments against DTS do not tell against DTC. Consider what was central to the 
first argument, viz. that we need an adequate truthmaker for intrinsic essential predications of 
God. DTC has no problem providing such truthmakers since such propositions are true in virtue 
of the essential intrinsic properties God instantiates. <God is F> is true because God's F-ness 
exists, where God's F-ness is that state of affairs or trope of God instantiating F-ness. So DTC, 
unlike DTS, is not committed to the claim that such propositions are true in virtue of God, which 
is explanatorily empty. 
 Turning to the second argument, DTC can explain the pattern of dependency exemplified 
in 
 
(1) God is wise because God is divine. 
 
Recall the plausibility of saying that the pattern of dependency exemplified between predications 
is explained by the pattern of dependency exemplified between certain worldly items. There is a 
certain fit of direction that exists between the dependency that holds between predications and 
the dependency that holds between worldly entities. If x's F-ness exists because x's G-ness exists, 
then this explains that x is F because x is G. Now DTC can (and should) say that God's wisdom 
exists, that God's divinity exists, that God's wisdom is distinct from God's divinity, and that 
God's wisdom exists because God's divinity exists. But then DTC has all it needs to explain the 
pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). The pattern of dependency exemplified in (1) is 
explained by the pattern of dependency in states or tropes involving how God is. So DTC, unlike 
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DTS, is able to provide a satisfying explanation for the pattern of dependency exemplified in (1). 
DTC, unlike DTS, imports enough structure into God in order to explain both the truth of 
intrinsic essential predications about God and the pattern of dependency exemplified in certain 
predications involving God. 
 
4  Conclusion 
Brower's goal in presenting and defending DTS is to make sense of divine simplicity; his goal is 
to show that divine simplicity is a coherent position
34
. Moreover, Brower hopes that showing this 
will “help to shift contemporary discussion of the doctrine away from questions about its 
coherence to questions about its plausibility.”35 Now as I hope is clear, this paper concedes that 
Brower has met his goal. The objections I have raised against DTS do not concern its coherence 
but its plausibility. Divine simplicity is, in principle, coherent. So I think that we should shift the 
contemporary discussion away from questions of coherence to questions of plausibility. And 
once we do, I think the verdict should be that divine simplicity, as understood by Brower, is 
implausible. For divine simplicity gets the facts about what God makes true wrong and is (at 
least as far as I can tell) unable to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified between certain 
predications about God. But no view of God should get the facts about what God makes true 
wrong. No view of God should be unable to explain the pattern of dependency exemplified 
between certain predications about God. So even if we grant, as I am, that divine simplicity is 
coherent, I do not think we should grant that it is plausible. Whatever merits divine simplicity 
has, I doubt that plausibility is one of them.
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